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the regionalization of environmental-impact assessment processes, in order to
ensure that the nongovernmental sector has a role in the protection of the North
American environment.
THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
By David A. Wirth*
The following words of Benjamin Disraeli nearly a century and a half ago sum
up quite well the situation we are dealing with in this panel. "Free trade," said
Disraeli, "is not a principle, it is an expedient." Today I would like to discuss the
interaction of this "expedient" with another domestic and international issue-the
environment. Ambassador Szekely has described this issue in some detail from
the Mexican side, and I would like to provide some additional views from a U.S.
perspective.
I would first like to discuss a recent lawsuit against the U.S. Trade Representa-
tive (USTR) alleging violation of U.S. environmental laws in the negotiation of
the proposed North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Secondly, I will
address the important issue of harmonization of domestic environmental standards
among Mexico, Canada and the United States. Finally, I will take up the question
of dispute settlement, which has significant implications for the environment.
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),' directs federal agen-
cies to consider the impacts of proposed federal activities in advance of their
execution. NEPA is the U.S. domestic version of the environmental impact assess-
ment methodology that Ambassador Szekely has described in an international
context. For governmental activities anticipated to have a significant adverse im-
pact on the environment, an analysis called an environmental impact statement is
required in advance of final action. The Council on Environmental Quality, lo-
cated, like the USTR, in the Executive Office of the President, is the chief care-
taker of the statute. The Council's regulations specifically state that proposed
international agreements are subject to the statute's requirements.2 The Depart-
ment of State also has regulations that apply NEPA and the environmental impact
statement requirement to international agreements.' The USTR in February pro-
duced a final environmental review to accompany the NAFTA negotiations.4
However, to the best of my knowledge, the Executive Branch has never claimed
that this document satisfies the statutory requirements.
In the past, various executive branch agencies have prepared environmental
impact statements for proposed international agreements. It is probably fair to say
that the implementation of the requirement for international agreements has been
uneven, and that not every agreement that might have adverse environmental
impacts has been analyzed as required by NEPA. On the other hand, a number of
*Washington and Lee University School of Law.
142 U.S.C. §4332(C).
240 C.F.R. §1508.18(b)(1) (definition of major federal actions to which NEPA applies, including
-treaties and international conventions or agreements").
122 C.F.R. §161.5.
'Office of the United States Trade Representative, Review of U.S.-Mexico Environmental Issues
(1992). See also U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Secretaria de Desarrollo Urbano y Eco-
logia, Integrated Environmental Plan for the Mexican-U.S. Border Area (First Stage, 1992-94) (1992).
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international agreements, including the Panama Canal Treaty,5 have been the sub-
ject of environmental impact statements, at least some of which explicitly rely on
NEPA as the legal authority for their preparation. Until recently, however, there
had been no litigation of the environmental impact statement requirement as ap-
plied to international agreements.
On August 1, 1991, three public interest organizations-Public Citizen, the
Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth-brought suit for declaratory and injunctive
relief in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia alleging application
of NEPA to the NAFTA and GATT Uruguay Round negotiations. This precedent-
setting case has implications far beyond the environmental consequences of trade
agreements. The Public Citizen lawsuit raises the question of the application of
statutory requirements to the negotiation of international agreements, an issue
with separation-of-powers overtones. One component of the NEPA process is
open consultation involving public comment. If successful, this suit would open
trade negotiations in particular, and the negotiation of international agreements
generally, to considerably more public scrutiny than is now standard practice. The
case also raises the issue of the application of NEPA and U.S. statutes generally to
effects that occur overseas-sometimes known as the "NEPA Abroad" problem.
Many of these fascinating questions may go unanswered. On January 7, Judge
June Green granted the Government's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of
standing.7 She also suggested that the case was not ripe and hence not justiciable.
Oral argument on an appeal currently pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia will be heard on May 4. If the Court of Appeals reaches
the merits in this case, it will be confronted with a history, admittedly spotty, of
the apparently smooth application of NEPA to the negotiation of international
agreements without, to my knowledge, interference with the Executive Branch's
constitutional prerogatives, disruption of negotiations, or objections from prospec-
tive treaty partners. In particular, it is important to realize that NEPA is a statutory
directive addressed only to federal agencies, not to private parties in the United
States or abroad. Even then, the law requires only preparation of an environmental
study. NEPA's application does not, as some on occasion have suggested, infringe
the exclusivejurisdictional prerogatives of foreign states that we customarily asso-
ciate with the term "sovereignty."
The second issue that I would like to discuss is "harmonization," a very impor-
tant issue in this trade agreement and others. The draft NAFTA text is reported,
like the Uruguay Round, rather antiseptically to address "harmonization" of"san-
'Besides the Panama Canal Treaty, for which the U.S. Department of State prepared a draft
environmental impact statement (EIS) in 1977, the Executive Branch has also prepared the following
final EISs in connection with the negotiation of the following international agreements: Montreal
Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer (Department of State & Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, 1988); Interim Convention on the Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals (Department
of Commerce and Department of State, 1985); Incineration of Wastes at Sea Under the 1972 Ocean
Dumping Convention (Department of State and Environmental Protection Agency, 1979); Renegotia-
tion of Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals (Department of Commerce,
1976); Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (Department of State, 1974); Ratification of
Proposed Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter
(Department of State, 1973); and Negotiation of an International Regime for Antarctic Mineral Re-
sources (Department of State, undated).
6Cf. Exec. Order No. 12,114, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1980), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. §4321 app. (articulating
attenuated requirements for analysis of environmental effects abroad of major federal actions).
7Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 782 F.Supp. 139 (D.D.C.
1992), appeal docketed, No. 92-5010 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 9, 1992).
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itary and phytosanitary measures." In essence, these measures are domestic regu-
latory measures governing contaminants in the food supply, including food
additives and pesticide residues such as those from alar and DDT. On the basis of
a recently leaked version of the NAFTA text, that agreement is reported to track
the December 1991 version of the GATT Uruguay Round, the so-called "Dunkel
Draft,"" on this issue. If that is the case, the stringency of domestic regulations
could be circumscribed by international standards such as those in the Codex
Alimentarius, an international body that, among other things, establishes pesticide
tolerances or "maximum residue levels." According to a recent General Account-
ing Office report, 9 those limitations are not necessarily as strict as U.S. standards.
Even if they are stricter than such international standards as those in the Codex
Alimentarius, domestic regulations like those of the United States would nonethe-
less be permitted if they are scientifically justified.
This requirement for "sound science," although it sounds attractive, is really a
red herring. Scientists routinely disagree on issues that are questions of public
policy rather than of science. Dispute settlement processes, like those reported to
be established by the draft NAFTA text, historically have almost no scientific
expertise on which to draw that would enable informed application of a scientific
standard in individual cases. As a result of this portion of the agreement, such
important statutes as the Delaney Clausesl 0-which prohibit the use of cancer-
causing food colorings, additives and animal drugs in any amount-could be af-
fected. The NAFTA text also reportedly requires preemption of state standards.
For example, some California standards in this area are stricter than federal regula-
tions. The United States would be required to override these more stringent re-
quirements of subsidiary governmental bodies despite the fact that, after long and
bitter battles in the Congress, national legislation specifically does not preempt
the ability of the fifty states to adopt more demanding pesticide standards under
certain circumstances."
Moreover, domestic environmental statutes, like those under which pesticide
residue limitations are promulgated, do not ordinarily anticipate international re-
view procedures like those under discussion in the GATT Uruguay Round and
those reported to be included in the current text of the NAFTA. Consequently, the
domestic mechanism for implementing adverse decisions from dispute settlement
processes under trade agreements is far from clear. One can imagine a situation
in which a foreign government, by means of a dispute settlement process pursuant
to a trade agreement like the NAFTA, would successfully challenge a U.S. pesti-
cide tolerance, which might then be withdrawn by the Executive Branch. In a
subsequent domestic action for judicial review of an alleged failure by the Execu-
tive Branch to promulgate pesticide residue limitations that meet domestic statu-
tory requirements for the protection of public health, a court might very well be
confronted with the potential application of the political question doctrine, which
'Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
in GAlT, Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA (Dec. 20, 1991).
9 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL FOOD SAFETY: COMPARISON OF U.S. AND CODEX
PESTICIDES STANDARDS (1991).
10 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act §§409(c)(3)(A), 512(d)(l)(H) and 706(b)(5)(B), 21 U.S.C.
§§348(c)(3)(A), 360b(d)(l)(H) and 376(b)(5)(B).
"See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act §24(a), 7 U.S.C. §136v(a); Safe Drinking
Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, Cal. Health & Safety Code §§25249.5-.13; Wisconsin
Public Intervenor v. Mortier, I ll S. Ct. 2476 (1991); COPARR, Ltd. v. City of Boulder, 942 F.2d 724
(10th Cir. 1991).
158 ASIL Proceedings, 1992
has particular vitality in the foreign relations area. Despite the Supreme Court's
rejection of the applicability of the political question doctrine to questions of statu-
tory interpretation in the 1986 Japan Whaling case, I2 the Government often raises
the doctrine as a bar to adjudication, as it did in the Public Citizen NEPA case.
Although I know of no studies addressing this question, it is intuitively plausible
that environmental regulations that might be nontariff barriers, as exemplified by
pesticide residue limitations stricter than international standards, are not necessar-
ily the biggest trade problem. Rather, countries with environmental policies that
are too weak-not those with excessively strict environmental regulations-may
present considerably larger threats of disruption to the integrity of the international
trade regime. In other words, industries in countries that fail to regulate pollution
of the air, water, and soil incidental to manufacturing processes obtain an unfair
trade advantage by comparison with industries in countries with more advanced
environmental policies. 13 One might think of this situation, this unfair trade advan-
tage, as a "pollution subsidy." So, for instance, the United States, which has
relatively strict environmental laws, should find it in its national interest to pull
all countries up to an international minimum standard instead of chopping them
down to a least common denominator. In any event, the general GATT rule, which
presumably will be adopted in the NAFTA, is that competitive advantages deriving
from discrepancies in national environmental policies cannot be offset by at-the-
border trade measures. Still, for some time trade agreements like the GATT have
targeted certain export subsidies. 4
Another area in serious need of reform is public access to international decision-
making processes like dispute settlement proceedings in the NAFTA. The recent
"tuna/dolphin" case in GATT, mentioned by previous speakers, demonstrates the
necessity for improved procedures. That case involved a provision of the Marine
Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), 15 a statute enacted in 1972, amended in 1984
and 1988, but never fully implemented by the Executive Branch. The statute re-
quires that the kill of dolphin incidental to fishing for yellowfin tuna with "purse-
seine" nets be comparable to that of the U.S. fleet. The remedies for not meeting
this standard are trade restrictions on imports of tuna from the offending country.
The Earth Island Institute, a private nonprofit organization, sued in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California and obtained a court order
directing the Executive Branch to impose a ban on imports of yellowfin tuna from
Mexico and other countries.16
"
2Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U.S. 221, 229-30 (1986).
13A 1972 OECD recommendation articulates the "Polluter-Pays Principle," intended as an interna-
tional minimum standard requiring the internalization of environmental costs for the express purpose
of eliminating trade distortions arising from disparate domestic environmental policies. Recommenda-
tion on Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies,
OECD Doc. C(72)128, reprinted in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD
and the Environment 23 (1986). The European Community applies the Polluter-Pays Principle inter-
nally. See Single European Act, Feb. 17 & 28, 1986, art. 25, 19 Bull. Eur. Comm. Supp. (No. 2), at
5 (1986), reprinted in 25 ILM 506 (1986) (adding new article 130R, para. 2, specifying "that the polluter
should pay," to Treaty of Rome); Recommendation Regarding Cost Allocation and Action by Public
Authorities on Environmental Matters, 18 OFF. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 194) 1 (1975), reprinted it BNA,
131 INr'L ENv'nL. REP. 1001 (implementing Polluter-Pays Principle).
'aSee, e.g., Agreement on the Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, B.I.S.D. 26th Supp. at 56 (1980) (GATT Subsidies Code).
1516 U.S.C. §1371.
6 Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 746 F.Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1990), affd, 929 F.2d 1449 (9th
Cir. 1991). The Court of Appeals affirmed a second order of the District Court, issued after a conclusion
that the federal defendants' subsequent finding that Mexico satisfied the statutory standard of the
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Mexico initiated dispute settlement process in the GATT, challenging the import
ban as a nontariff barrier to trade. The dispute settlement panel ruled in Mexico's
favor.' 7 What is interesting in this context is the process by which the dispute was
adjudicated. In contrast to the opportunities for public input into the legislative,
administrative and judicial fora in which this dispute was treated on the domestic
level, but consistent with standard GATT procedures, the documents and oral
proceedings in the case were not accessible to the public. ' 8 Dispute settlement in
GATT does not provide for participation by private parties as intervenors or amici.
However, in the tuna/dolphin case, ten other GATT contracting parties and the
European Economic Community made written submissions to the panel, all of
which were critical of the MMPA ban and most of which argued that that action
is inconsistent with the GATT.' 9 Further, the Executive Branch, which had ig-
nored three statutory directives and reluctantly implemented the import ban under
court order, represented the United States in the GATT dispute settlement pro-
cess. Particularly against the background of the closed nature of the GATT pro-
cess, there were obvious questions as to whether the Executive Branch vigorously
defended the U.S. position. Consequently, there is every reason to believe that
important perspectives were not adequately presented to the GATT dispute settle-
ment panel, which, at least as a formal matter, had access to a spectrum of views
that was considerably less than complete.
Open hearings and general availability of documents in publicly constituted
adjudicatory processes are ordinarily thought to be desirable, if not necessary, to
the integrity of those processes. Further, it is axiomatic that those who could be
affected should have an opportunity to present their positions in adjudicatory
MMPA was illegal. The District Court recently granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction
and issued an order clarifying the broad extent of a secondary ban on imports from intermediary nations
that purchase yellowfin tuna abroad and export it to the United States. Earth Island Institute v.
Mosbacher, 785 F.Supp. 826 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
17United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, reprinted in 30 ILM 1594 (1991). The three-
member dispute settlement panel noted that discrimination by importing states based on the methods
by which foreign goods are produced, as opposed to characteristics of the foreign goods themselves,
is not warranted by the GATr. Consequently, the GATT requires competitive treatment of imported
products as such without regard to the environmental policies of the country of export. Further, the
exceptions in article XX of the GATT for trade measures directed at the protection of animal life or
health or the conservation of natural resources must be narrowly construed. In light of that interpreta-
tion, the drafting history of the agreement and the broader implications for international trade, the
panel concluded that trade measures to protect resources outside the jurisdiction of a contracting party
are not permissible. Further, the United States had failed to demonstrate that the import restriction
primarily aimed at conservation or that measures less burdensome to international trade as such were
unavailable. Presumably because of its stake in the NAFTA negotiations, Mexico postponed presenta-
tion to the GATr Council of the panel report. See WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1991 at A26 (advertisement
by Government of Mexico). The GATT Council recently rejected a request by the European Economic
Community to adopt the Mexican Tuna panel report. See GAT Council Refuses EC Request to Adopt
Panel Report on U.S. Tuna Embargo, 9 INT'L TRADE RE'. (BNA) 353 (1992).
"
t See, e.g., Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveil-
lance, Annex 6(iv), B.I.S.D., 26th Supp. at 210 (1980). ("Written memoranda submitted to the panel
have been considered confidential, but are made available to the parties to the dispute.") See also
Draft Final Act, supra note 8, §S T 12. 1-2 (draft understanding on rules and procedures governing the
settlement of disputes under Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT specifying that "written memoranda
submitted to the panel shall be considered confidential").
9 See Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance,
supra note 18, 15 ("Any contracting party having a substantial interest in the matter before a panel,
and having notified this to the Council, should have an opportunity to be heard by the panel.").
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proceedings that could have an impact on their interests. Moreover, it is well
accepted that an expansive, as opposed to constricted, array of relevant perspec-
tives presented to a tribunal increases the likelihood of an accurate result. For
these reasons, many domestic legal systems, including that of the United States,
generally require open judicial proceedings whose workings the public can scruti-
nize and allow interests that are not party to a dispute, but that nonetheless will
be affected by the outcome, to participate in dispute settlement processes as inter-
venors or amici.
Until relatively recently, however, only states as represented by governments
were considered subjects of international law, and the international system still
acknowledges only a very limited role for the individual. But as graphically demon-
strated by the GATT dispute settlement process, decisions that directly affect the
lives, health and livelihoods of individuals can be taken to the international level
by governments with little or no accountability directly to the public. Although
some scientists, businessmen, and nongovernmental organizations have managed
to carve out niches for themselves as observers or advisers to multilateral institu-
tions and processes, policy and practice among international organizations regard-
ing public participation-a principle, if not a right, that we take for granted on the
domestic level-remains very uneven and has not been standardized. In any event,
trade agreements seem to be lagging behind other substantive areas of international
law in this regard.
There is now a need to define expanded rights of participation by the public in
international processes like dispute settlement proceedings under the NAFTA and
the GATT. Openness in governmental processes, we now know, is essential to
ensuring public accountability. Public scrutiny of documents of international orga-
nizations and multilateral processes should be considerably expanded.
Washington and Lee University will host a symposium on the trade and environ-
ment connection in late September. The tentative title for that conference is "Envi-
ronmental Quality and Free Trade: Interdependent Goals or Irreconcilable
Conflict?" As I have suggested, there are ways for the two issues to reinforce
each other. First, trade agreements can be structured to target pollution subsidies,
a priority goal before whose full realization attacks on environmental measures as
nontariff barriers are, in my opinion, inappropriate. Secondly, dispute settlement
process and the negotiation of new or modified trade agreements can be opened
to public scrutiny and participation. However, as I have also tried to suggest, I
fear that recent trade developments, and the draft NAFTA in particular, unneces-
sarily risk exacerbating rather than ameliorating the situation.
DISCUSSION
JOHN B ACELO:* I want to ask a question that relates the NAFTA to the Free
Trade Agreement. I had the impression in the negotiations between the United
States and Canada on the Free Trade Agreement that the unfair trade remedies
area was particularly controversial and central to that agreement and in the end
led to the rather unique binational panel provisions as a sort of compromise. In
the agreement between the United States and Canada, there is a provision for
continued negotiation for seven years, five years, and then an extension of two,
toward new regimes for antidumping and countervailing duties. Now the trilateral
negotiation is going on at the same time. My question is whether there is anything
*Cornell Law School.
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happening on the required negotiation between Canada and the United States in
this unfair trade remedy area, and whether that is being merged into the trilateral
negotiation. A somewhat related question is whether the unfair trade remedy area
is controversial in the trilateral negotiations in the way that it was in the bilateral
negotiations.
Mr. SHOVER: What came out of the FTA was the bilateral panel structure which
is procedural rather than substantive, and an agreement to negotiate toward or to
consider changes in U.S. substantive law, as well as in Canadian law. In the
NAFTA negotiations, we are having discussions, but not much has happened. Is
the Chapter 19 trade remedy issue controversial? Definitely. We have discussed
that at length in the NAFTA with the Government of Mexico, which has concerns
similar to those of Canada going into the FTA negotiations. So, the controversy
relates both to whether the NAFTA will address substantive rights on trade reme-
dies and to whether there should be a procedural mechanism similar to the FTA
Chapter 19.
Mr. LIER: I will add just one point. One of the reasons why there is not a lot of
activity going on in the subsidy discussions is the parallel negotiations going on in
the GATT, and the hope is that they will produce something concrete, thereby
either resolving the problems we had bilaterally or providing a basis upon which
to negotiate further.
EDWARD LANG:* Could you give us a general sense of the concepts in the draft
relating to rules of origin, bearing in mind the Honda case? Could you also give
us a sense of what the draft is saying about escape clauses t la GATT Articles
XIX, XX and XXI? I am interested in getting an answer to this question in general
terms in relation to how the draft stands at the moment and to its possible extension
to the rest of the hemisphere.
Mr. SHOVER: I cannot speak to any specifics, but I can tell you in general what
is on the table in terms of rules of origin. Rules of origin help to identify the country
in which the last substantial transformation occurred before a good is imported.
The idea behind rules of origin in a free trade agreement is to ensure that the
benefits of the agreement accrue primarily to the parties to that agreement. In the
U.S.-Canada FTA, change in tariff classification was used for the first time as the
principal mode for determining substantial transformation. The FTA has been a
model that the NAFTA negotiators have looked to carefully. An alternative to the
change in tariff classification is the use of value added or value content to deter-
mine whether there has been sufficient economic activity within the territory to
warrant the benefits of the tariff preference. Value content rules were used in
the Canada FTA, most often in hybrid rules that require both a change in tariff
classification and a particular percentage of local value content. The required
percentage of value content in the Canada FTA is 50 percent. The value content
level was defined in such a way that it has given rise to concerns addressed very
publicly between the U.S. Customs Service and Honda about its Canadian opera-
tion. In the view of the U.S. Government, the controversy arose not from the
language of FTA, but from the results of an audit of a company. Frankly, we have
not done many audits yet in this area. The resources are such that we do not audit
all the companies that claim benefits under the U.S.-Canada FTA. As to how these
limited resources would be impacted if other countries of the hemisphere accede
*New York Law School.
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to an agreement like the NAFTA, I have no idea. Perhaps these countries would
try to negotiate different terms.
As to the escape clause, I would suggest again the model of the U.S.-Canada
FTA. There are two issues, one bilateral, the other global. On the bilateral side,
in the Canada FTA, if, as a result of the tariff elimination (tariffs on U.S.-Canada
trade are being scaled down to zero over ten years), an industry suffers serious
injury, then the escape clause mechanism allows either country to "snap back" a
most-favored-nation (MFN) rate to protect that industry. The other issue is on the
global side. Do you include Canadian goods in an escape clause action taken under
Article XIX of the GATT that would otherwise be taken on an MFN basis? Both
concepts are very much at stake in the NAFTA. I cannot tell you specifically
where the negotiation stands but those two issues are being discussed.
Professor BURR: I would like to ask Michael Leir to comment briefly on the
Canadian perspective on the Honda dispute over rules of origin and the Honda
cars.
Mr. LEIR: I asserted earlier that the devil is in the detail, and this is a classic
example. An interpretation by the Customs Department has resulted in a result
that we feel undermines the value of the FTA, and the point is being disputed in
the specifics of the case itself. We would look upon the NAFTA as an opportunity
to improve upon the rules of origin.
SAMI KALLEL:* What kind of economic relationship will exist between the
NAFTA and the EC, and what kind of dispute settlement is being discussed under
the NAFTA? Will it be the same as the one under the GATT provision, or will it
be a specific one to the region?
Mr. SHOYER: We are rather less ambitious now than the EC in what we are
proposing for the NAFTA. I do not think NAFTA will have any legal or juridical
personality, so it is rather less than a relationship among the parties. It would have
no particular relationship with EC. Under Article XXIV of the GATT we are
proscribed from creating trade barriers to outside trade; therefore, to the extent
that the NAFTA will be consistent with that, as is intended, there will be no
additional barriers. We hope we will continue to trade with EC countries to the
same or a much greater extent.
Dispute settlement provisions will probably be like those of the GATT, although
I cannot speak specifically. We have been looking at the GATT and the U.S.-
Canada FTA as models. Despite some real differences, Chapter 18 of the FTA is
a useful model for government disputes. In addition, there are other types of
dispute settlement for invester-state disputes in the FTA. We are examining them
as a potential model, as well as Chapter 19, which is quite different. Chapter 19
does not deal with a government-to-government dispute. The dispute is not about
the agreement itself, among the parties, as in Chapter 18 of the Canada FTA.
Rather, it is about whether a government has applied its own domestic laws prop-
erly; those are different models, and there is some controversy about that.
LAKSHMAN GURUSWAMY:** I have a question for Ambassador Szekely. I was
interested to hear you say that environmental impact assessments were more
uniformly and more expansively applied in Mexico. The question is, as you know
in this country, environmental assessments are made but you do not necessarily
need to act upon the results. Is that the situation in Mexico, or are you obliged to
act on the results of the assessment so that you do not take the route that causes
*Georgetown University Law Center.
**University of Arizona College of Law.
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environmental damage? I also have a question for David Wirth. Assuming that
one can undertake an environmental impact assessment, how do you propose
doing that with a moving target like a trade negotiating process? Is it something
that lends itself to the type of impact assessment we have been talking about?
Mr. SZEKELY: I do not think I said that the environmental impact statements
were more extensive in Mexico. I said that in the letter of the law they were
mandatory for many more activities than in U.S. legislation. I think that the legisla-
tion of Mexico is also more advanced in this respect, in the sense that once you
have complied with your obligation to submit to the competent authority an envi-
ronmental impact statement, you have to describe not only what the impact will
be but also what mitigation measures you are prepared to undertake. The govern-
ment-the competent authority-will tell you whether your impact assessment is
accurate or insufficient, whether it will allow you to go ahead with the proposed
mitigation measures or with additional ones that the authority imposes or perhaps
it will not authorize you to proceed no matter how many mitigation measures you
put in. The important thing is that the public has a right to participate in this
process of defining the impact and the mitigation measures, and even in the process
of determining whether to approve the activities. So this legislation does have far-
reaching consequences. But I want to emphasize that although this is in the letter
of the law, we are only now establishing the first precedents. I was looking last
week at the list of environmental impact statements that have been submitted to
assessment and approval by the competent authority. There is an official list that
covered up to January of this year, which is almost up to date. And this mandatory
requirement has been in place in our law since 1988. Therefore, the list covers
almost five years, and I was amazed to find that only 443 environmental impact
statements were submitted in the entire country in five years, and that more than
half came from two governmental agencies which obviously have directors of legal
affairs that are very strict about complying with the law. Almost all other public
entities that undertake projects of activities, for instance, the minister of communi-
cations, who is in charge of road building-a very big thing going on in Mexico
right now-has not been present in the compliance with our legislation and envi-
ronmental impact statements. I want to emphasize that, while the letter of the law
is very good, we now have to make it good in application.
Professor WIRTH: I will respond to your second question about how as a practi-
cal matter to do an environmental impact statement on a treaty negotiation, partic-
ularly one that is a moving target. As you know, the first step in the environmental
impact statement process is to identify the proposed action, and already we have
run into the "moving target" problem that you identified. By the way, of the ten
to twenty agreements that I mentioned that had been the subject of environmental
impact statements, the proposed action was not always negotiation of the agree-
ments. Sometimes it was Senate advice and consent to ratification; if it was an
agreement that did not require Senate advice and consent, the proposed action
was sometimes mere deposit of the instrument of ratification by the Executive
Branch. Not all of those ten to twenty were actually done on the negotiations
proper.
If we skip over identification of the proposed action, the core of an environmen-
tal impact statement is the analysis of alternatives. It is pretty clear that if one
were to do an environmental impact statement on a treaty negotiation, among
those alternatives are alternative negotiating positions. So the fact that the pro-
posal may be somewhat difficult to identify, in contrast to a typical impact state-
ment on a dam or a highway, does not necessarily mean that the alternatives
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and their impacts cannot be identified and assessed. Which of those alternatives
actually is identified as the proposal may be difficult to determine at an early stage,
but that does not necessarily imply that the alternative negotiating positions cannot
be assessed. The process also anticipates supplements to environmental impact
statements. If there were a radical discontinuity in the negotiation at some point,
the original environmental impact statement could be supplemented. Incidentally,
these principles of environmental impact assessment are now well accepted on the
international level. For instance, a new multilateral agreement' adopted and signed
by the United States last February requires the application of environmental im-
pact assessment methodologies to a broad variety of activities with transboundary
effects. Also, USTR's study, which I mentioned earlier, contains much of the
information and analysis that would be included in an environmental impact state-
ment. Its principal defect from a statutory point of view is its failure to analyze
alternatives-in particular, alternative negotiating positions.
NAOMI RHOT-ARRIAZA:* I would like the panelists to address natural resource
policy in conjunction with what they have been talking about on the environment.
In the U.S.-Canada FTA, one of the areas that nongovernmental organizations
have pointed to as being most problematic is the question of natural resource uses.
Looking especially at energy use, provisions in the U.S.-Canada FTA seem to
encourage export of fossil fuels by removing barriers to exports of natural re-
sources; also, there have been a number of disputes over reforestation and over
forestry practices in British Columbia in conjunction with that agreement. Now,
extrapolating that experience to a trilateral agreement, at the same time that on
the one hand the Mexican Government says that there will be no changes in the
Mexican constitution with respect to control of oil, on the other hand there is in
the FTA encouragement of energy exports. So it seems that there are a number
of conflicting provisions there. What has been talked about, what has been done,
and how do you see the natural resources sector coming out in the FTA?
Mr. LEIR: I would not say that the FTA encourages exports; the FrA does not
erect any barriers to exports. There is a big difference there, whether we are
talking about natural resources or any type of manufactured product, in that the
lowering of tariffs or the removal of nontariff barriers would not necessarily en-
courage exports. The debate over forestry practices and environmental controls
is something that predates the FTA, and it has been a longstanding issue and
concern for governments and environmental groups going back ten or fifteen years
at least. The FTA itself has had no impact on forestry practices in that context.
MONROE LEIGH:** My question would have been about the Calvo doctrine and
how you expect to get past that to dispute resolution, but I'm sure it cannot be
answered in the time available so I am going to yield the floor to Professor Jackson.
CRAIG JACKSON:*** I have a question about structure or logistics. A lot of
people have thought of the NAFTA as an outgrowth of the FTA, although all that
has to be negotiated. But if, somehow, a regime is worked out to deal with the
dumping and countervailing areas in the FTA and that does not happen vis-t-vis
the U.S. and Mexico in the NAFTA, what kind of structure could there be? Would
the FTA exist separately from the NAFTA, or would there be a special regime
'Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Feb. 25, 1991,
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between the U.S. and Canada that doesn't exist between the United States and
Mexico?
Mr. SHOYER: I do not know. At this point it is really a matter of substance.
What we are trying to do as the negotiations near conclusion is throw the issue
open to see where we are and see, in Vienna Convention terms, whether we should
suspend certain aspects of the FTA, supplant it in whole or in part or keep it alive
and use it by reference. All those things remain to be seen, but I think the substance
will drive those determinations.
Mr. SZEKELY: I am interested now in the response that would have been made
to the question about the Calvo clause.
Mr. SHOYER: Mexico passed a decree law several months ago that goes a long
way to resolving the problem. I suggest everyone read it. It is a fascinating docu-
ment. Mexico has tried to address the Calvo clause problem itself, but I don't
think it completely solves the problem. We are looking at our great success in the
bilateral investment treaties as we negotiate with Argentina, where Calvo was
born, and I think some events in Mexico have actually helped to ameliorate some
of the concerns on Calvo. The problem is not gone yet.
Mr. SZEKELY: Are you willing to say that this so-called law on treaties that was
passed by Congress has in a way solved the Calvo clause problem?
Mr. SHOYER: I do not think it has solved it, but it certainly addresses some of
the concerns about Calvo.
Mr. SZEKELY: That is very interesting because, in any case, this law of Congress
is in a way derogating the Constitution, after all the Calvo clause is a constitutional
provision. I find the suggestion extremely interesting that that law and treaties
that have been published would have any legal effect on the Constitution.
CHRISTINE ELWELL:* I have a question on dispute settlement. In talking about
the parallel track negotiations that are going on about environmental and labor law
standards, may I just add that there is generally not a great deal of confidence in
those negotiations because people remember the International Trade Organization
(ITO) history, the history of the Havana Charter where other chapters on develop-
ment, for example, were negotiated and dropped at the opportune moment once
the commercial negotiations had been completed. But, assuming these parallel
track negotiations are going well, may I ask whether the negotiators are consider-
ing the integration of those environment and labor standards into the main agree-
ment, or will they remain on a parallel track? Do the negotiators anticipate
providing some sort of trinational inspection team for private prosecution in each
of the states to enforce minimum standards? I would suggest that if those process
mechanisms are not dealt with, there will be a great deal of litigation involving
national, traditional trade instruments such as border measures and duties-a
great litigious program of dubious efficiency. Do the parallel track negotiations
envision public participation in the dispute settlement mechanisms of the main
agreement?
Mr. SHOYER: Regarding most of your comments, I do not know whether those
things have been addressed. As to the last point, I have strong personal feelings,
which are not necessarily the view of the U.S. Government although they happen
to match its current view: that is, I find very troubling the notion of public partici-
pation in what is otherwise dispute settlement in a club. The GATT is a club of
sovereigns, and I don't understand how such public participation would work. I
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know others have talked about it at great length, but I am not sure how U.S.
interests are to be represented with more than one voice. I have litigated in the
GATI and under the U.S. free trade agreement with Israel. I have great difficulty
with the notion of amici people participating because I am concerned about how
U.S. interests can be reflected; it is a highly controversial issue. Those are my
personal views.
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